Abstract: This paper describes a concept and method of effectively applying information-theoretic cryptography to real-time system communications. Information-theoretic security, also known as unconditional security, is independent of the computing power or time an opponent can bring to bear. These properties are suitable for power systems which require both few computational resources and long life time. We show some case studies to apply this scheme into several electrical power system applications, the experimental results and the examinations of key management also.
INTRODUCTION
With the increasing dependence on information networks in social infrastructure such as power systems, transportation systems, and so on, safeguarding the security of information is now a crucial issue. Considering cyber security requirements for such systems, authentication of control actions is far more important than "hiding" the data through encryption. However, the authentication methods proposed to date such as MAC are not always suitable. This is because they employ computational cryptographic primitives commonly used in IT, which cannot provide the assurance of long-term security in view of the inevitable increase in computational power available to opponents or attackers who may have quantum computers in the future. The long-term means 10 years to 25 years for which period devices in electrical power systems, for example, can be expected to be in continuous operation. Moreover, although cryptographic methods shall not interfere with real-time communications, devices in such systems commonly cannot equip enough computational resources, i.e. a high speed CPU and large memories. This paper described a novel approach to these issues which employs information-theoretic cryptographic primitives based on the information theory initiated by Claude Shannon. We consider that the proposed approach is suitable for adoption not only in power system but in general industrial system such as instrument and control systems.
POWER SYSTEMS WITH REAL-TIME COMMUNICATION
Today's power systems could not operate without a tightly knit communications capability. Considering the increased dependence upon power system communications, protecting the electricity supply system from terrorist attacks will require new technology to enhance the security of power system commands, control and communications, including both hardware and software. Moreover, as the transformation of the current electrical network into an intelligent grid, called Smart Grids, is carried out, it is more important to assure the cyber security of the systems in the grids because Smart Grids employ a utility-wide, two-way data communication network connecting customers, distributed resources and field devices, with the enterprise systems.
In light of these backgrounds, the possibility that Intelligent Electric Devices (IEDs) such as protection relays or other control functions as well as various devices in Smart Grids will be exposed to growing security threats, including internal attacks, is becoming high.
Considering cyber security requirements, in fact, for most power system operations, authentication of control actions is far more important than "hiding" the data through encryption. It is clear that IEDs such as relays and smart grid terminals such as smart meters or control units need authentication schemes. For power system communication, IEC 62351 recommends that a Message Authentication Code (MAC) should be generated (as defined in RFC 4634) through the computation of the SHA-256 hash function as a general authentication solution for real-time communication data in substations [1] . However, the authentication methods proposed to date such as MAC are not always suitable for such devices. This is because they employ computational cryptographic primitives commonly used in IT, which cannot provide the assurance of long-term security in view of the inevitable increase in computational power available to opponents or attackers who may have quantum computers in the future. The long-term means 10 years to 25 years for which period smart meters or IEDs can be expected to be in continuous operation. If authentication algorithms deteriorate, in view of cost-efficiency and availability, it is difficult to update the appropriate software of these great many devices in service, which are generally ROM based embedded-systems.
Moreover, considering the requirements of real-time communication for pilot protection relays or other control functions, the security SICE Annual Conference 2011 September 13-18, 2011, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan overhead should be minimized and the algorithm should be simplified in order to verify the operation of these devices and quickly detect the intrusion. Such constrains for power system devices are referred in [2] .
CRYPTOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND AND AUTHENTICATION ALGORITHM
By the way, Message authentication schemes can be classified as either computational security or information-theoretic security [3] . Computational security can rely on computational infeasibility. Information-theoretic security, also known as unconditional security, for which the idea of perfect secrecy and the use of entropy techniques in cryptography were pioneered by Shannon [4] , is independent of the computing power or time an opponent can bring to bear; this authentication scheme is referred to as authentication codes, or A-codes, which are equivalent to the so-called universal hash families. We found that A-codes are suitable for IEDs and smart grid terminals because of two prominent features:
-Independence of computer power: for several decades after deploying these devices, it will not be necessary to update the security software and parameters because of the independence from the computing power of opponents.
-Controllability of opponent's deception probability. A-codes are based on information theory, so that the probability is computable and controllable. In other words, for example, power system engineers can design an appropriate authentication scheme for each communication system. The first published paper on A-codes was by Gilbert, Williams and Slone [5] . Although A-codes can theoretically be very secure and their general theory has been continuously developed by many cryptologists, the concept is not so widely known outside of the cryptographic research community and they have been rarely used in practical applications. The main reason may be that, to generate an authentication tag, part of the key is consumed, which implies that a huge number of keys are required when many data are transmitted.
To eliminate the defect for practical applications, we have realized a novel A-code scheme so that A-codes can be applied practically to real-time communications which normally have periodical transmission and the data amount of which is predictable [6] . It can achieve both negligible deception probability and reasonable key size. To illustrate the scheme, we provide a concrete example whose principle is outlined in Equation (1) and Fig. 1 . For details, see [6] . (In Equation (1), the multiplication and addition of each component of a vector and a matrix is just a logical AND operation and an Exclusive OR operation, respectively.) At the transmitter, an authentication tag is generated for each source state (i.e. sampled voltages and currents, phasor voltages and currents, or demand and energy data), using a set of keys (U, v), with a certain timing (e.g. analogue data sampling timing, phasor calculation timing or demand response timing). The transmission data consists of a source state x and its authentication tag y, which are periodically sent through the communication channel. At the receiver, the received source state x' and authentication tag y' of the data transmitted are authenticated using a key identical to the key located at the transmitter.
where, x: a-bit vector representing a source state U:
binary matrix with a rows and b columns v:
b-bit vector y:
b-bit vector representing an authentication tag for x +: bit-wise Exclusive-OR operation.
To create an authentication tag, calculation of (1) is necessary. The computation has relatively low complexity and is readily performed by IEDs or smart grid terminals. At each time step, a fresh v is required, but U can remain unchanged. The scheme is quite simple, but it can achieve deception probabilities P d0 (for impersonation) = P d1 (for substitution) = 1/2 b [5] . The set of keys, each of which is used only once, are preinstalled in each device (transmitter and receiver) in the same manner as other setting operations. 
CASE STUDIES
We discuss the reliabilities achieved by our proposed method, for typical real-time system applications.
Protection relay system
A protection relay is a device that detects abnormalities (system faults) such as short circuits and earth faults occurring in an electric power system or power equipment within several tens of milliseconds, and issues a command to isolate the faulty part from other normally functioning parts without delay. There are many protection schemes, for example over current protection, under voltage protection and so on, according to many field requirements. Fig.2 . is an example of differential protection system which is one of fabulous protection schemes. It is based on Kirchhoff's circuit laws, and is widely used in the field of power system protection. To apply this scheme to transmission lines protection, protection relays are equipped at each transmission line terminals, and each relay measures current value at each terminal as sampling data, respectively. The sampled data are transmitted to each other relays per every less than 2 milliseconds to calculate differential current and detect system faults. For example, relays can detect the faults within dozens of milliseconds after it occurs. To transmit sampled current data, communication channel are required between terminals. 
The relatively large key memory size of 1.5 TB may not be a critical problem for protection relays in the future, because widely available flash memory chips can record up to 32 GB today, and Moor's law hints that it will be possible to install 1 TB flash memories for storing keys in each relay in years to come. The opponent's deception probabilities of 2.33 × 10 -10 are so small that the proposed scheme can provide a very secure system. For example, they are rather less than the misdetection rate of CRC-CCITT (16-bit CRC), which is known to be 2 -16 = 1.53 × 10 -5 for random noise. CRC-CCITT is one of the most widely used error detection codes employed in not only pilot carrier relay communications but in general power system communications.
When an adequate number of keys are prepared, A-codes can achieve long-term maintenance-free security. The required key storage in the relays depends on the transmission rate, the system configuration, the operation period and the reliability to be achieved. Fortunately, in protection systems, we can define these parameters so clearly at our system engineering stage that the required key storage capability can be accurately estimated.
Measurement system
For Measurement system, the necessary key memory size can be much smaller than those required by protection systems because the number of A-packets that include control commands and event information is fewer and the A-packets are transmitted per lower periodic cycle than protection systems. Thus, considering worst-case conditions, including periodical metering we can assume that the average transmission rate is one A-packet per second. The other parameters in the example for control systems are the same as those used in the above example for the protection system. The intrusion probabilities are 2.33 × 10 -10 and the necessary key memory size is 2.4 GByte.
Smart meter
For Smart Grids, smart meters employed at customers/distributed generators enable accurate registration of load/generation profiles in real-time, sending the stored data to central systems using power line carrier (PLC), basic radio frequency (RF), and so on. Therefore, the cyber security risk may be higher than that of IEDs in substations. The parameters in the example are as follows:
Transmission 
The key memory size needed is rather less than 1MB. Although the cost of smart meters may be substantially less than that of IEDs employed in substations, the memory size needed is practical nowadays. Considering the communication requirement of the other devices employed at distributed resources is similar to that of smart meters, the A-codes scheme is useful to many devices of Smart Grids.
PERFORMANCE AND COMPARISON RESULTS
In order to verify whether the algorithm which we have introduced in formula (1) is suitable for real-time protection and control communications, we conducted two experiments. Firstly, we implemented the algorithm using C-language software and measured the execution times on a current differential relay. Fig.3 shows the effect of message lengths on the execution times with various authentication tag lengths. The execution time increases in proportion to message length. The authentication tag lengths do not seem to be critical for execution time. Thus, it is not a good choice to employ a shorter authentication tag length with lower reliability. We also found that there are large differences between the average and worst times. The reason is that the execution times are influenced by CPU cache hit/un-hit. This suggests that the proposed algorithm can provide a sufficiently short execution time for existing real-time protection and control communications with just some increase in the CPU cache size. For the message length required for future protection schemes, it has the potential to achieve the required execution time, using a higher-grade architecture CPU and improved implementation. It is important to remember that the clock speed of a CPU used for embedded applications such as IEDs and smart grid terminals might be restricted by thermal issues, which also has a serious impact on the cost and reliability of these devices. Thus, the proposed algorithm is suitable for this issue because it does not need a high speed processor, as explained in the discussion above. Conversely, when we measured the execution time of SHA-256 with openssl 0.9.8g, which is a computational cryptographic scheme, commonly used in IT, in C-language software on the same relay, the execution time was more than several hundred microseconds. This indicates that the implementation of a computational cryptographic scheme such as SHA-256 into these devices is more difficult than for the A-codes scheme.
We also compare the results obtained using the proposed method to that obtained by the representative authentication method, HMAC, as shown in Table 1． Each item compared is referred to in [7] considering SCADA architectural constraints. This illustrates that A-codes are superior to HMAC in all items except for the key management scheme. Furthermore, we have considered the data format for transmission message and key storage which are suitable for A-code. We have also conducted a reliability test with general-purpose PCs. For details, see [6] .
SECURE KEY MANAGEMENT

Issues
The key management of the proposed system is one of the most important issues. If an opponent steals the key, it is easy for the opponent to deceive the transmitter/receiver by impersonation and substitution. Thus, the proposed system needs secure key management, including key generation, key distribution, and key setting.
For the key generation, the key for calculating authentication tags should be generated with a pure random number generator in a maintenance room in a control station. We cannot adopt pseudorandom number generators for this purpose because the very basis of unconditional security of A-codes comes from the randomness but not from pseudo randomness.
For the key distribution, the generated key is copied and these keys are delivered to both devices mainly by perfect secure methods such as reliable personnel who store and carry the keys with SD card, micro SD card or USB memory. There are, indeed, many possible threats when the personnel carry the key to each device. An opponent might attack the personnel and impersonate and substitute the key. Thus, the keys itself should be encrypted before being carried to the devices using the A-codes scheme. They might be authenticated when being installed into the flash memory.
For the key setting, the key is installed into the flash memory of each device, and the devices start real-time communication with the A-codes using the key from the flash memory.
Practical solutions
In this section we consider several solutions for issues above.
(1) Prepare large key storage on each devices As mentioned in section 4.1, our proposed authentication method still needs large key storage. This might be recognized as costly disadvantage against computational security scheme. However, as mentioned in section 5, if HMAC scheme is applied to protection relay, some special devices such as FPGA or co-processor would be required to calculate HMAC because HMAC calculation with general purpose processors is too slow. This means that computational security scheme also might require additional devices, and this might cause the similar costly increase as large key storage for A-code.
But even though large key storage could be used, to keep the keys in the storage securely during 20 years could be another issue to solve.
(2) Use secure key exchange protocol Key generators can use Diffe-Hellman key exchange protocol, which allows two parties that have no prior knowledge of each other to jointly establish a shared secret key over an insecure communications channel, to distribute generated keys securely. However this protocol is based on computational security so that this solution departs from "unconditional security" framework.
(3) Use physical information which opponent cannot observe In the protection system mentioned in section 4.1, we examine to use harmonic currents as the key to calculate A-code. As precondition, we assume that the opponent cannot intrude power systems with the exception of communication channels as shown in Fig.4 .
On power transmission network, there are alternating current waves not only with system frequency (50Hz or 60Hz), but with integral multiple of system frequency, called harmonic currents. The source of harmonic currents varies according to power systems, which are power electronics devices such as inverter, non-linear property of power system components, power loads, and so on. It is almost impossible to estimate the properties of harmonics in advance because there are many sources of harmonics, and branches on power transmission networks. Protection relays in section 4.1 sample current data per every 30 degree as electrical angle, and transmit it to each other via communication channel. The 30 degree electrical angle corresponds to 600Hz if system frequency is 50Hz. The opponent who observes the transmitted data on the channel can calculate only up to the 5 th harmonic (250Hz) and cannot calculate the 7 th harmonic (350Hz) and the beyond because of the Shannon's sampling theorem [8] . Therefore if each relay ROM size is limited because HDD cannot be used in relays.
samples current with higher frequency and calculates higher harmonic but transmits only the 30 degree sampled data as usual, the relays can share information, in short higher harmonics, secretly.
The harmonics calculated on each relay are not the same actually. The main reason is the difference of properties of current transducer (primary CT) connected to each relay. We are studying to adjust the difference to get same values. Or, even if we do not adjust the difference, if we consider these harmonics as close-related two random variables, we might be able to apply the result of theoretic research [9] which can share the information securely from the random variables.
It is natural that general SCADA systems also have physical information which can be gotten only within the system, and set assumption that the opponent cannot intrude the system physically. Therefore the idea considered in this section might be able to be extended to other systems than protection relay system.
CONCLUSIONS
There have been few real-world applications for A-codes, but we show that A-codes are appropriate for real-time protection, control and measurement. The proposed method is suitable for adoption, not only in pilot carrier relays and in wide area protection systems, but also in general power systems, such as SCADA , substation automation and smart grid which use real-time communication and in which software or firmware updating is difficult and there is a need for deterministic responses to events.
Moreover, we consider that the proposed message authentication method is suitable for adoption not only in power system but in general industrial system such as instrument and control systems which use similar constraints as power systems.
